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Enough FDI quickens growth everywhere
Abstract
It has proved hard to find evidence of a stable and important role
for FDI promoting economic growth and helping poor countries catch
up to rich ones. This is likely because FDI effectiveness depends on
context, which the nearly universal linear empirical growth model ob-
scures.
We use a partially non-linear model to discover an FDI thresh-
old, below which FDI has no effect on growth, but above which it
has a strong and substantial effect. We also discover that there is
no starting-income threshold for FDI effectiveness. Rather, poorer
countries benefit more from FDI.
We learn too that FDI helps poor countries catch up to rich ones,
and is sometimes necessary for it. Nearly all countries with sufficient
FDI, poor and rich, are converging in income. However, among coun-
tries without sufficient FDI, there is a convergence threshold. Those
with a high enough starting income are converging, while the poorer
ones are not.
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Enough FDI quickens growth everywhere
Summary
We study the relationships between FDI, growth, and cross-country income con-
vergence in 128 countries over three ten-year periods each, spanning 1970 to 1999.
We use a non-linear growth regression model which lets us distinguish the macro-
economic experience of each country individually. We learn the following.
• A country must receive a minimum amount of FDI before its macroecon-
omic growth rate responds. The FDI threshold is not high, occurring at
18 times per capita GDP. This is the level of inflow achieved by, for exam-
ple, Nicaragua (1970-79), Madagascar (1970-79), Israel (1970-79), Cyprus
(1990-99), and El Salvador (1980-89). Nevertheless, half the countries in
our sample had at least one ten-year period in which FDI fell below the
threshold.
• When FDI is in sufficient quantity, it makes a substantial contribution to
economic growth. It increases the growth rate of GDP per capita by between
0.83 and 1.57 percentage points each year, depending on the actual amount
of FDI.
• Countries do not need to surpass an income or development threshold before
they can either attract enough or benefit from FDI at the macroeconomic
level. Many initially poor countries receive FDI above the FDI threshold,
while some initially rich countries do not receive enough FDI to make a
difference in growth rates. Further, the beneficial effect of FDI, when it is
sufficient, on growth is larger as starting income is lower. Poorer countries
tend to benefit more from FDI, which is necessary if it is to help them catch
up to richer countries.
• Among countries in which FDI is sufficient to be effective at the macro-
economic level, convergence is global. Given the other growth factors in
the model, all these countries are growing to a common long-term income
level. Poorer countries are catching up to richer ones. However, the rate of
convergence is very slow, at 0.06 percent per year.
• Among countries in which FDI is not sufficient to be effective at the macro-
economic level, convergence is local, selective. That is, there is an starting-
income threshold. Above it, countries are converging to a common long-term
income level. Below the starting-income threshold countries are not converg-
ing. The threshold occurs at 32 percent of the starting income of the U.S.
Two-thirds of countries without sufficient FDI fall below the convergence
threshold and so are not catching up to richer countries.
• FDI is, therefore, important for both growth and convergence, probably
because it is the main channel of transmission of technology across countries.
FDI is even necessary for convergence among the poorest countries which
start out below the starting income threshold. However, even when FDI
is sufficient to substantially enhance growth, the convergence rate across
countries is too slow to matter in practice.
1 Questions about FDI
Foreign direct investment is supposed to advance economic growth in the receiv-
ing country. It would do this primarily by transferring technology from sending to
receiving countries and, in the receiving countries, from foreign to domestic firms.
Since richer countries tend to have more advanced technology than poorer coun-
tries, FDI is also supposed to help poor and middling countries eventually catch
up to rich country income levels.
Governments everywhere and international institutions believe deeply that
FDI does these things.
[FDI] is especially important for its potential to transfer knowledge
and technology, create jobs, boost overall productivity, enhance com-
petitiveness and entrepreneurship, and ultimately eradicate poverty
through economic growth and development. (The “Monterrey Con-
sensus”, United Nations International Conference on Financing for
Development, 2002, p.5.)1
Yet, according to macroeconomic evidence across countries, FDI is not per-
forming as expected or hoped (section 4). That evidence is ambiguous, careful
studies coming to opposing conclusions. Where the effect of FDI on growth is found
to be positive and statistically significant, it is economically unimportant, often
actually harmful. There is no indication that FDI helps poorer countries catch
up to, converge with, richer ones. This evidence does not support the attention
FDI gets from policy-makers or the resources from governments and international
institutions to attract it.
The failure to establish a stable and important role in economic growth and
development for FDI likely is because its impact depends on context. Countries
may need a well-educated labor force, extensive financial system, or minimum
level of trade or development to benefit from FDI. This, too, is hard to establish,
because nearly all studies use a linear empirical growth model to interpret data.
The linear specification averages out the widely varying histories, structures and
institutions of different countries. For example, it forces growth factors to operate
1The Consensus is named after the conference venue in Mexico. It was signed by more
than fifty countries and by the heads of the United Nations (UN), International Monetary
Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organization (WTO). The Consensus
and supporting documents are available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N02/392/67/PDF/N0239267.pdf
1
the same way in Haiti and the United States, severely limiting what we can learn
about when and how FDI works.
Previous researchers tried to bypass the linear restriction of the growth model
by somewhat arbitrarily splitting samples according to income level or adding new
explanatory variables. In particular, they created multiplicative variables in which
FDI interacts with the alternative domestic institutions identified above. Again,
the results are tenuous and inconclusive.
We, instead, relax the linear constraint on the data, re-examining the role of
FDI in growth and convergence using a partially non-linear cross-country empirical
growth model. This model allows economic growth to respond to its non-linear
determinants differently in different countries. Similar models have been used
before to address convergence, but not to account for the role of FDI in growth
or convergence. We use the model to look for thresholds in FDI and development
(starting income), minimum levels needed in each country to increase growth and
catch up to richer countries. We also look for complementarities between FDI and
development.
Specifically, we begin to answer the following questions:
• Is a minimum amount of FDI needed in-country before it becomes an im-
portant factor in aggregate growth?
• Is a minimum level of development, starting income, needed before FDI
becomes effective or countries converge?
• Does effective FDI help developing countries catch up to rich ones in income?
FDI may promote growth in certain countries, such as those with a sufficient
amount of FDI or level of development. If it does, and if the way FDI promotes
growth is by transferring new technology, it may also promote convergence among
those countries. Or it may not, if richer countries benefit as much or more from
FDI, in terms of growth, as poorer countries. Conversely, if FDI facilitates conver-
gence among some countries, it must also promote growth at least in the poorer of
those countries. Countries may also converge in income without the help of FDI if
technology is transferred through other channels, such as trade, or if they already
share a common aggregate technology.
2 Research strategy
We apply an econometric regression model of economic growth to a sample of
macroeconomic data from a large number of countries over a long period of time.
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As is usual, we start from the canonical empirical growth model of Mankiw, Romer,
and Weil (1992), which is explicitly derived from the theoretical Solow growth
model. We add to the model variables for the main channels of technology trans-
mission across countries, namely trade and FDI.
We are chiefly interested in the contribution of FDI and starting income to
growth, the latter being the convergence variable. In our version of the model
these two variables are jointly related to growth in a non-linear way, to allow them
to interact fully with each other and to distinguish their contribution to growth in
each country. The other variables enter the model in the usual linear fashion.
Our data are taken from public sources (Table A-5). We have a sample of
128 countries (Table A-1) with observations from 1970 to 1999. (We describe our
data completely in Appendix A.) We aggregated the annual observations into
three ten-year period averages. These periods are long enough to eliminate the
temporary effects of random shocks and business cycles. We experimented with
five-year periods but found the results too volatile to interpret.
2.1 Model and interpretation
Here is the model:
GRO = β0 + β1INV + β2POP + β3LIFE0 + β4OPEN
+ g(GDP0, FDI) + η (1)
in which
GRO is the rate of economic growth,
INV the share of domestic investment in GDP per capita,
POP the rate of growth of the population,
LIFE0 initial life expectancy at birth,
OPEN the share of exports plus imports in GDP per capita,
GDP0 initial GDP per capita relative to that of the U.S.,
FDI net inflows of FDI relative to GDP per capita,
g() a non-linear function of inter-acting variables, and
η the statistical error of the estimated model.
The linear part of the model covers domestic investment in physical capital
(INV ), the population growth rate (POP ), life expectancy as a measure of in-
vestment in human capital (LIFE0), and the share of international trade in the
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economy (OPEN). We also include dummy variables for the three ten-year pe-
riods, though we do not report them. The non-linear part of the model covers
starting income (GDP0) and FDI (FDI). Starting income is the convergence vari-
able since, within a group of converging countries, those that start out at a lower
income must be growing faster and thereby catching up to the rest. Countries ben-
efit from FDI here when there is a positive relationship between FDI and growth.
They converge in income when there is a negative relationship between starting
income and growth.
We initially included in the model indicator variables for regions, major oil
exporters, and countries with populations of less than a million. None of these
was statistically significant in early estimations, so we dropped them.
There is no theoretical presumption that FDI will accelerate economic growth
by transferring new technology to the receiving country. It depends on the start-
ing technological gap between the sending and receiving countries. The greater
the gap, the older the vintage of the technology transferred and the slower the
speed at which it is transferred (Wang and Blömstrom, 1992). If the technology
introduced is too old relative to the international standard, or the speed at which
the technology is transferred too slow, it may not have an important impact on
the macro-economy. So, whether FDI adds to the growth rate is an empirical
issue, and this, rather than the fully linear model specification, may explain the
difficulties previous studies have had in finding a positive role for FDI.
Theory does support the existence of an FDI-growth threshold. Given an ini-
tial technological gap, in-country transfers of technology from foreign to domestic
firms, “spill-overs”, increase with the amount of FDI. A minimum amount of FDI
may then be needed before results are noticed at the macroeconomic level. This
possibility has not been investigated so far.
There is also no theoretical presumption that FDI facilitates convergence.
One of the sources of convergence is technology transmission from one country to
another, and FDI is a central vehicle for that (Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee,
1998).2 However, even when the technology transferred by FDI increases growth
2The other source of convergence is domestic capital accumulation, captured in the
model by the variable for domestic investment. Which of the two sources drives, or con-
strains, convergence depends on whether aggregate technology, the aggregate production
function, is initially common to all countries or differs across countries (Bernard and
Jones, 1996; Quah, 1996a; Romer, 1993). A country’s aggregate production function en-
compasses, for example, its sectoral structure and industrial pattern and its capacity to
research, develop, and implement new technologies. These indeed vary significantly from
country to country. In that case, technology transmission across countries would be key
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in each country, it is not necessarily the same technology in all countries. As
mentioned, the vintage of the technology transferred depends negatively on the
starting technological gap. With technological gaps contributing to income differ-
entials (Borensztein et al., 1998), initially richer countries may then benefit more
from FDI. If richer ones benefit at least as much as the poorer ones, they may al-
ways be richer. Then a minimum starting income may be needed for convergence.
If there are FDI or convergence thresholds in country experiences, we may
split the sample at the threshold or thresholds and re-estimate the partially non-
linear model on each sub-sample. This would yield insight into the relationship
between FDI and convergence, following the logic outlined above. That would,
in turn, reveal to some extent whether FDI contributes to growth, if it does, by
transferring technology.
Splitting the sample by estimating the model beforehand is quite different
and more informative than splitting the sample by starting income before estimat-
ing the model, as do some previous FDI studies. Our approach follows that of
some previous convergence studies which use various non-linear model estimation
techniques. However, they do not allow a role for FDI (section 4).
2.2 Related models
We initially followed practice in the growth regression literature of including a
variable for education in the linear part of the model as the main measure of
human capacity. Liu and Stengos (1999), in a model without FDI, found a linear
relationship between education and growth, even though they allowed for a non-
linear relationship. We found in early estimations of both a fully linear version
and the partially non-linear version of the model that education is not statistically
significant in our sample (subsubsection 3.1.1). We therefore excluded it from
subsequent analysis.
Previous studies dealt with the difficulty of finding important relationships
between FDI or starting income and growth in linear models in part by adding
explanatory variables. These specify certain differences between countries, since
linearity prevents the model itself from doing so. The same is true of panel estima-
tion techniques which account for unobserved random or fixed differences across
countries. Supplemental explanatory variables typical of studies focusing on either
FDI or convergence are trade, the real exchange rate or black market exchange
rate premium, government consumption, and political or social stability (Durlauf
to income convergence.
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and Quah, 1999, Table 2). Convergence studies usually also add a variable for
population health, such as life expectancy, while FDI studies add variables for the
labor force participation rate, inflation, and the depth or sophistication of financial
markets.
It is hard to know how seriously to take these extra explanatory variables
as growth factors. Durlauf and Quah (1999) say they are essentially arbitrary, do
not identify economic structure, are not mutually exclusive, are often correlated
with each other, and are not ranked in order of importance for explaining growth.
Most importantly for us, the extra terms hinder the purpose of understanding
the role of FDI in growth and convergence. They have not helped find a strong
positive contribution of FDI to growth. They do make it easier to find convergence,
but at the same time they cloud what convergence means. For one thing, in the
linear model the extra variables implicitly sort the sample into groups of similar
countries, making it much more likely that convergence, if found, is local, among
some but not all countries in the sample. For another, convergence is conditional
on the other growth factors in the model. With many such factors, it would not
be clear that poorer countries are in fact catching up to richer ones (Bernard and
Durlauf, 1996; Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Quah, 1999,
1996a).
We choose to limit our variables to those in the core growth and FDI models,
with the addition of trade as an alternate channel of technology transmission. We
rely on the partially non-linear specification of the model to identify differences in
growth effects across countries. This strategy has the added benefit of clarifying
interpretation of the results and permitting a greatly enlarged sample of countries.
2.3 Model estimation
We use and compare two methods to estimate the model of equation 1. The main
one is partially non-linear and semi-parametric (PNSP), as described just below.
The other is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on a modified version of the model,
where we replace the non-linear element g(GDP0, FDI) with the linear elements
β5GDP0 + β6FDI. We do not use panel data techniques on the linearized model
for the reason given earlier, and for easy comparison to the PNSP estimates.
The PNSP method uses the local-constant, leave-one-out kernel-smoothing
estimator implemented in the “np” (non-parametric) package of the statistical
software “R”(R Development Core Team, 2008). That estimator is described in
Hayfield and Racine (2008) and references therein. Kernel-smoothing estimates
regression functions by applying a weighting scheme to the data to smooth and
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sum the contribution of each observation to the overall estimate. The estimator
chooses the smoothing weights, the so-called bandwidths, with reference to the
data through least squares cross-validation. This is a procedure that minimizes
the residual sum of squares, a measure of the discrepancy between the data and
the representation of the data made by the kernel-smoothing estimator.
A major advantage of the kernel-smoothing technique over the usual OLS
and fixed or random effects panel linear models is that it avoids the problem of
reverse causation that pervades the FDI literature.3 That is, the effect of FDI on
growth identified by the model will not be biased by the potential effect of growth
on FDI, since all such inter-actions are accounted for in the estimation of the joint
probability densities of growth, FDI, and initial GDP.
3 Resulting evidence
To summarize our strategy, we study a sample of 128 countries, with three obser-
vations to each country consisting of starting values or averages for the periods
1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99. In the following we report results for both OLS
and PNSP estimates of equation 1. We tried two versions of the linear model, one
with a multiplicative term, GDP0 × FDI, and one without. In the linear model
the multiplicative term expresses one kind of inter-dependency between starting
income and FDI. The multiplicative term is never statistically significant nor does
it make an important difference to results from the rest of the model. So, we do
not report the linear model containing the multiplicative term.
3.1 Preliminary lessons
Although education is usually included in empirical growth models as the primary
measure of human capital, in our sample it is not a statistically significant growth
factor. So, we exclude it from the model, and this allows us to increase the size
of our sample substantially beyond the norm. In the expanded sample, the linear
estimate finds that FDI increases the growth rate and that countries are converging
to a common long-term level of income. However, these linear findings cannot
say whether FDI helps growth equally in all countries, or whether all, or only
some, countries are converging. A non-linear model is needed to answer those
questions. The non-linear model represents the data much better than the linear
3An exception is Carkovic and Levine (2005), who use the Generalized Method of
Moments linear panel estimator.
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one, suggesting that FDI and convergence do operate differently in unlike countries.
3.1.1 Education does not help growth
We first estimated a linear version of the model with an education term, EDUC0,
the average years of schooling in the population aged 15 and above at the start of
each period (Table A-5). The education variable is only available in 88 countries.
Its coefficient is negative, so it appears to reduce growth, and it is not statistically
significant (OLS(1) in Table 1). We confirmed this result in an early estimate of
the non-linear version of the model, which we do not report. We excluded the
education term thereafter, relying on life expectancy to measure human capital,
because then we could substantially increase the size of our sample, by nearly half
again above the norm in the literature. We need a large sample if we are to split
it at identified thresholds and re-estimate the model on each sub-sample.
3.1.2 FDI helps growth and countries converge
Eliminating EDUC0, we re-estimated the linear model on the larger sample of 128
countries (OLS(2) in Table 1). There are a number of important changes to the
results. First, there is a small improvement in the growth model’s representation of
the data. The R2 measure of the share of the changes in the data from observation
to observation that is explained by the model increases from 25.4 percent to 27.5
percent. This despite the loss of a variable (R2 usually increases slightly when an
explanatory variable is added, regardless of its statistical significance).
Second, there is a striking change in some of the estimated coefficients. The
positive coefficient on domestic investment increases substantially in magnitude,
and goes from statistically insignificant to highly significant. Similarly, the nega-
tive coefficient on starting income increases substantially in magnitude (in absolute
value), and goes from statistically insignificant to highly significant. Finally, the
positive coefficient on FDI becomes marginally statistically significant in the ex-
panded sample, indicating that it does, indeed, enhance growth. Thus we already
find in a linear growth model convergence and a role for FDI in growth without
resorting to lots of supplemental explanatory variables or modeling unobserved
country effects. The increase in sample size made the difference.
In neither of the linear models, with or without an education term, is the
population growth rate statistically significant. In both of them life expectancy
and the share of trade in the economy are positively related to growth and strongly
statistically significant.
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Table 1: Cross-country growth regressions
(Full samples)
OLS(1) OLS(2) PNSP
Constant −0.2125 *** −0.2667 ***
(−3.414) (−5.512)
INV 0.0053 0.0088 *** 0.0082 ***
(1.431) (3.195) (3.086)
POP −0.0022 −0.0020 −0.0027
(−0.933) (−1.210) (−1.347)
LIFE0 0.0422 ** 0.0571 *** 0.0442 ***
(2.373) (4.217) (3.135)
OPEN 0.0086 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0091 ***
(3.477) (4.291) (4.521)
GDP0 −0.0029 −0.0076 *** Not
(−1.125) (−3.664) reporteda




nobs 264 382 382
R2 0.2536 0.2751 0.3781
RSE 0.0253 0.0245 0.0005
Notes
1. The dependent variable is the growth rate (GRO). See equation 1 and Table A-5
for a description of this and the independent variables listed in this table.
2. “OLS” is the Ordinary Least Squares parametric linear regression model.
“PNSP” is the partially non-linear, semi-parametric regression model.
3. The statistical significance codes are: 0.01 ***; 0.05 **; 0.1 *. The parentheses
contain t statistics.
aGiven the existence of a threshold in the effect of FDI on growth (subsection 3.2),
non-linear convergence results mingling observations on both sides of the threshold are
not meaningful.
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3.1.3 Not all countries benefit
We then estimated the non-linear model as set out in equation 1. The linear part of
the PNSP estimation nearly replicates the corresponding explanatory variables of
the fully linear model (compare PNSP and OLS(2) in Table 1). There is the same
pattern of coefficient signs (positive or negative) and significance, and differences
in coefficient values are minor. However, the non-linear model represents the data
much better. R2 rises from the linear 27.5 percent to a non-linear 37.8 percent.
Since the non-linear model allows for country differences in growth effects of FDI
and starting income, the FDI benefit may not touch all countries equally, and not
all countries necessarily converge to a common long-term income.
3.2 There is an FDI-growth threshold
The non-linear regression estimates confirm that the effect of FDI on growth varies
across countries (Figure 1). We display this graphically. We also super-impose the
linear estimate on the graph for comparison, when the linear estimate is statisti-
cally significant. For FDI, the linear estimate intersects the lower of the 95 percent
confidence bands for the non-linear estimate and otherwise lies largely outside the
non-linear confidence interval. Thus, the FDI-growth relationship is non-linear.
That is, the increase in growth one would expect to see from a marginal increase
in FDI depends on the current level of FDI in the country.
Further, there appears to be an FDI-growth threshold, a minimum amount
of FDI needed in a country before FDI benefits macroeconomic growth. To the
left of the threshold, which occurs at the value ln(FDI/GDPpc) = 2.85, the
mean estimate of the relationship between FDI and growth fluctuates wildly. The
confidence bands are wide and admit arbitrary horizontal lines throughout the sub-
sample, indicating that the relationship is not statistically significant. On such a
horizontal line, an increase in FDI would have no effect on growth. To the right of
the threshold, the mean estimate and the confidence interval are upward-sloping
throughout, indicating a statistically significant positive relationship.
The FDI-growth threshold is not high, corresponding to FDI at about 18
times per capita GDP. This is the average level of FDI inflow achieved by, for
example, Nicaragua (1970-79), Madagascar (1970-79), Israel (1970-79), Cyprus
(1990-99), and El Salvador (1980-89). Nevertheless, nearly half the countries in
our sample experienced at least one ten-year period in which FDI fell below the
threshold (Table A-2). These episodes account for one-third of our country-period
observations.
10
Figure 1: FDI-growth threshold









































To verify the existence of the threshold, we sorted our sample in increasing
order of realization of FDI, dividing it at the threshold. We then returned both
sub-samples to the original arrangement (country and period). We re-estimated
the linear and non-linear models on each sub-sample, reporting the results below.
We formally compared the estimates from the linear model in the two sub-samples.
The test statistic for the null hypothesis that they are the same is F(8,364) = 4.059,
yielding a p-value of 0.00012. The data strongly reject the null hypothesis and the
linear estimates in the two sub-samples are statistically significantly different from
each other.
3.2.1 Insufficient FDI is ineffective
There are interesting changes to the linear outcomes of both the linear and non-
linear models in the sub-sample of countries and periods with FDI below the growth
threshold, compared to those of the full sample (Table 2). Life expectancy becomes
statistically insignificant. So does FDI in the linear model, and its coefficient turns
negative. The trade term remains strongly statistically significant, and its positive
coefficient increases substantially in magnitude. Trade may substitute for FDI in
promoting growth in countries where FDI is too small to be effective. Finally, in
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Table 2: Cross-country growth regressions
(Sub-samples)
FDI below threshold FDI above threshold
OLS PNSP OLS PNSP
Constant −0.2211 ** −0.2444 ***
(−2.375) (−4.472)
INV 0.0106 ** 0.0072 * 0.0092 *** 0.0101 ***
(2.082) (1.703) (2.829) (2.949)
POP −0.0052 −0.0062 * 0.0005 0.0012
(−1.474) (−1.930) (0.271) (0.416)
LIFE0 0.0378 0.0278 0.0524 *** 0.0471 ***
(1.393) (1.117) (3.501) (2.954)
OPEN 0.0132 *** 0.0140 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0056 ***
(2.935) (3.358) (2.884) (2.776)
GDP0 −0.0079 * Figure 6 −0.0055 ** Figure 5
(−1.960) (−2.294)
FDI −0.0001 Figure 2 0.0036 *** Figure 3
(−0.039) (3.293)
nobs 126 126 254 254
R2 0.2766 0.5321 0.3311 0.3092
RSE 0.0303 0.0006 0.0199 0.0004
Notes
1. The dependent variable is the growth rate (GRO). See equation 1 and Table A-5
for a description of this and the independent variables listed in this table.
2. “OLS” is the Ordinary Least Squares parametric linear regression model.
“PNSP” is the partially non-linear, semi-parametric regression model.
3. The statistical significance codes are: 0.01 ***; 0.05 **; 0.1 *. The parentheses
contain t statistics.
the linear model starting income remains statistically significant and its coefficient
negative, still indicating convergence, but its level of significance drops to marginal.
The fit of the non-linear model to the data in the below-FDI-threshold sub-
sample is again, as in the full sample, much better than that of the linear model.
The R2 measure of fit nearly doubles from 27.7 percent for OLS to 53.2 percent for
PNSP. The mean estimate of the FDI-growth relationship in the non-linear model
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Figure 2: Contribution of ‘below-threshold’ FDI to growth


























is highly non-linear (Figure 2). Since this sub-sample is small, 126 observations, we
display confidence bands at the 90 percent level. Recall that the linear coefficient
for FDI is not statistically significant, so we do not display it. The non-linear
confidence bands contain arbitrary horizontal lines, such that FDI would have no
impact on growth at all. We conclude, then, that the linear and non-linear models
consistently show that FDI below the threshold is not effective for growth.
3.2.2 Sufficient FDI is effective
In the larger sub-sample with FDI above the growth-effect threshold, results for
the linear model and for the linear part of the non-linear model are again largely
the same and, moreover, qualitatively the same as the corresponding results from
the full sample (Table 2). Domestic investment, life expectancy, and trade are all
positive in sign and strongly statistically significant. Population growth changes
sign in this sub-sample, appearing to increase growth, but remains statistically
insignificant. Starting income remains negative in sign and strongly significant in
the linear model.
As for FDI, in stark contrast to the results from both the below-FDI-threshold
sub-sample and the full sample, it is positive in sign and strongly statistically sig-
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Figure 3: Contribution of ‘above-threshold’ FDI to growth








































nificant in the linear model. The magnitude of the FDI coefficient in the linear
model also increases substantially. With FDI contributing to growth, the coeffi-
cients on trade in the two models fall back to about their levels in the full sample.
The fit of the linear model to the data in the above-FDI-threshold sub-sample
(R2 of 33 percent) is better than its fit in either the below-FDI-threshold sub-
sample or the full sample (R2 of nearly 28 percent in each case). As well, in the
above-FDI-threshold sub-sample, the linear model fits the data marginally better
than the non-linear model (R2 of nearly 31 percent). The mean estimate for FDI
of the non-linear model is nearly linear (Figure 3). It is different, though, in the
sense of statistical significance, from the coefficient on FDI in the linear model,
which intersects the lower 95 percent confidence band of the non-linear model. We
conclude that the effect of FDI on growth when FDI exceeds its growth threshold
is positive, nearly linear, and strongly statistically significant.
3.3 FDI helps poorer countries more
Our evidence does not support the possibility that, in addition to an FDI threshold,
countries need to surpass an starting income or development threshold before they
can benefit from FDI at the macroeconomic level. Recall that, in preliminary
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analysis, a multiplicative term in the linear model, GDP0 × FDI, capturing one
form of such a requirement, was not statistically significant. As already mentioned,
the non-linear estimator accounts for all forms of interaction between starting
income and FDI. Yet, FDI benefits growth in all countries and periods in which
FDI exceeds its growth threshold, regardless of their starting income. Many poor
and middling countries receive enough FDI to see growth respond (Table A-3).
Conversely, most countries in which FDI under-reaches its growth threshold in
some periods are low-income, but many are also lower-middle-, upper-middle-, or
high-income (Table A-2).
The non-linear results displayed above show the effect FDI has on growth in
each country individually when all other variables, including starting income, are
held constant at their median values in the data, the same value for all countries in
the sample. To check the dependence of the FDI-growth effect on starting income,
which represents the level of development, we estimated the non-linear model on
the full sample twice more, holding starting income constant at the third and
seventh data decile respectively, all other variables still at their median values
(Figure 4). Changing starting income this way does not affect the location of
the FDI-growth threshold. Everywhere above the threshold, the beneficial effect
of FDI on growth is larger as starting income is lower. Poorer countries tend to
benefit more from FDI.
3.4 Convergence depends on FDI and starting income
We compare convergence patterns between country-periods in which FDI exceeds
the growth-effectiveness threshold and those in which it does not. In the for-
mer, where FDI exceeds the threshold, the mean estimate of the non-linear model
is downward-sloping nearly everywhere. Given the other growth factors in the
model, namely domestic investment, population growth, population health, and
trade, nearly all countries are converging to a common long-term income level
(Figure 5).4 Where the mean estimate turns briefly upward-sloping over short
intervals of starting income among the richer countries, the upturns are easily
contained by the 95 percent confidence bands, such that they are not statistically
4In the non-linear model for the above-FDI-threshold sub-sample, the bandwidth ob-
tained by least-squares cross-validation for the relationship between GRO and GDP0 is
about 0.44. This yields an excessively variable relationship, due to numerous local minima,
which is a known tendency of the least-squares cross-validation method. We increased the
bandwidth to 1.00 to smooth out some of the spurious local fluctuations and get a better
overall perspective on the relationship, presented here.
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Figure 4: Dependence on GDP0 of the FDI-growth effect







































GDP_0 at decile 5 (median)
GDP_0 at decile 3
GDP_0 at decile 7
significant. The evidence accords with the conclusion that all countries receiving
FDI in amounts sufficient to enhance growth are converging.
The linear model too finds a negative and strongly statistically significant co-
efficient on starting income, indicating convergence (Table 2). As always, though,
the linear model cannot say whether all of the countries in the sub-sample are con-
verging, especially as the starting-income coefficient lies nearly everywhere outside
the lower confidence band of the non-linear estimate. Recall that the linear model
fits the data a little better than the non-linear one.
Among countries and periods in which FDI falls short of the growth thresh-
old there seems to be a convergence threshold, a minimum starting income beyond
which countries converge in long-term income, but below which they do not (Fig-
ure 6). The linear estimate, which is statistically significant, intersects the lower
90 percent confidence band twice at the location of the apparent threshold. Below
the convergence threshold, the confidence interval contains arbitrary horizontal
lines, suggesting no statistically significant relationship between starting income
and growth. Above the threshold the interval mostly slopes downward, with the
mean estimate flattening out at the very highest income levels. The convergence
threshold occurs at 32 percent of the starting income of the U.S. Two-thirds of
16
Figure 5: Effect of starting income on growth with ‘above-threshold’ FDI


































countries without sufficient FDI fall below the convergence threshold and so are
not catching up to richer countries.5
3.5 FDI is economically important
Among countries and periods in which FDI surpasses its growth-effect threshold,
FDI at the median value for the group increases the growth rate of GDP per capita
by between 0.83 percentage points per year (estimate of the non-linear model) and
1.57 percentage points per year (estimate of the linear model).6 The two estimates
5This sub-sample, with FDI less than its growth-effectiveness threshold, is too small
to be meaningfully divided further at the convergence threshold. The group with initial
incomes higher than the convergence threshold consists of 42 observations.
6The median value of ln(FDI/GDPpc) in the sub-sample where FDI exceeds the
growth-effect threshold is 4.36. At that point, the slope of the curve showing the relation-
ship between FDI and growth in the non-linear model is about 0.0019 (Figure 3). The
equivalent slope in the linear model, given by the coefficient on FDI (which is indepen-
dent of the level of FDI), is 0.0036 (Table 2). The estimated effect of FDI on growth is
calculated as smFDI ×mFDI, with mFDI the median value of FDI and smFDI the slope
of the appropriate curve (linear or non-linear model) at median FDI.
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Figure 6: Effect of starting income on growth with ‘below-threshold’ FDI


































converge to the higher value as the amount of FDI increases. In sufficient quantity,
then, FDI makes an important contribution to economic growth.
Among the same countries, with sufficient FDI, convergence is nearly global.
However, the rate of convergence is very slow, at 0.06 percent per year, based on
the median starting income. The initially poorest of these countries are converging
at a slightly faster pace, at 0.11 percent per year, than the initially richer countries,
at 0.03 percent per year.7
Among countries in which FDI is not sufficient to be effective at the macro-
7 The estimated convergence rate is calculated as ln(1 + α)/ − T , with α the slope
of the curve relating starting income to growth (Figure 5 in the non-linear model and
the coefficient on starting income in the linear model (Table 2)) and T the elapsed time
period on which the regression model is estimated (9 years). In the non-linear model the
slope of the curve depends on the starting income. We calculated the linearized slope
over three starting income intervals using only the end-points. The three intervals are
ln(GDP0) = [1.0, 2.0], [2.5, 3.5], [3.75, 4.5]. The first interval represents the initially poorest
countries, the last the initially richest, and the middle interval encompasses the median
starting income (ln(GDP0) = 2.97) in the sub-sample with FDI sufficient to enhance
growth. It turns out that the linearized slope of the curve over the middle interval is
about the same as the coefficient on starting income in the linear model.
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economic level, convergence is local, selective. That is, there is an starting-income
threshold. Above it, countries are converging to a common long-term income
level. The rate of convergence is about 0.22 percent.8 Below the starting-income
threshold countries are not converging.
4 Related evidence
Previous empirical growth studies investigate the role of FDI and convergence in
growth models largely separately. While most FDI studies include starting income
as an explanatory variable, it is not discussed. Convergence studies do not include
a term for FDI, despite its potentially important role transmitting technology
across countries. A rare exception to this split in the literature is Blömstrom,
Lipsey, and Zejan (1992).
4.1 FDI and growth
Cross-country evidence on whether FDI influences economic growth is contradic-
tory. For example, two early influential studies find that FDI has a statistically
significant impact on growth in all countries (Blömstrom et al., 1992) and in de-
veloping countries (Borensztein et al., 1998). However, a recent influential study
of FDI in all countries found no such effect (Carkovic and Levine, 2005).
The studies which find a statistically significant effect of FDI on growth in
one form or another find that it is often harmful. In Borensztein et al. (1998)
the direct effect is negative, and the net effect, including an interaction term
with schooling, is positive only for developing countries with high initial levels
of general education. This is the case for two-thirds of their sample. In Alfaro,
Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) the direct effect of FDI on growth is
positive, but the net effect, including an interaction term in FDI and the domestic
financial sector, is negative for most countries in the sample. Alfaro (2003) studies
the effect of FDI on growth within sectors of the economy. She finds that FDI in
the primary sector has a statistically significant negative effect on growth, while
in the manufacturing sector it has a statistically significant positive effect.
When the effect of FDI on growth is found to be statistically significant
and positive, it is economically unimportant. In Borensztein et al. (1998) at the
8See footnote 7 for the way we calculate the convergence rate. Here we linearized the
slope of the convergence curve of Figure 6 over the interval ln(GDP0) = [4.0, 5.0], which
is above the convergence threshold value of 3.47.
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sample mean for schooling, a moderate increase in FDI of one standard deviation
of the data increases the growth rate by 0.003 percentage points each year. In
Alfaro (2003) in the manufacturing sector, at the sample mean, a one standard
deviation increase in FDI increases growth by 0.012 percentage points each year.
By contrast we find that, among countries which surpass the FDI-growth threshold,
a one standard deviation increase in FDI increases the growth rate, at the sample
mean, by between 1.05 (non-linear estimate) and 1.98 (linear estimate) percentage
points, an economically important amount.
The difficulty finding a robust relationship of any kind between FDI and
growth probably arises because the potential role of FDI depends on context.
That is, it may contribute to macroeconomic growth in some situations but not in
others (Alfaro et al., 2004; Borensztein et al., 1998). For example, countries may
need to attain a certain level of income before they can benefit from FDI. Studies
investigating such a possibility divided countries by starting income level before-
hand, and then checked for differences in estimated model parameters. Blömstrom
et al. (1992) find in a small sample of developing countries that there is a statisti-
cally significant relationship between FDI and growth among middling countries,
but not among poor countries (see also Blonigen and Wang (2005)).
Or, FDI may need some complementary domestic institutions to be present in
sufficient extent or depth before it benefits macroeconomic growth. Countries may
need to start out with a well-educated labor force (Borensztein et al., 1998) or a
sophisticated financial system (Alfaro et al., 2004). These studies just cited indeed
find supportive evidence for such dependencies using explanatory growth variables
that multiply together FDI and a particular domestic institution. However, as
already noted, the resulting direct and net effects of FDI on growth are often
negative or economically unimportant. Further, Carkovic and Levine (2005) fail
to find an effect of FDI on growth even after accounting for dependencies on
education, domestic finance, or trade.
The search for context also motivated our own study. Our finding of an FDI-
growth threshold, estimated rather than imposed beforehand, can explain previous
difficulties in finding a strong and positive role for FDI in macroeconomic growth.
Given the FDI-growth threshold, our evidence does not support the idea that
countries need to reach a minimum level of development before they can benefit
from FDI.
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4.2 FDI and convergence
Most FDI studies find a statistically significant and negative coefficient on starting
income, indicating that there is convergence to a common income level among at
least some countries in the sample. An exception is Carkovic and Levine (2005)
who estimate the FDI growth model on both pure cross-section (pooled) and com-
bined time-series and cross-section (panel) constructions of the same data sample,
and with various FDI interaction terms, in separate regressions. In most of the
regressions they obtain conditional convergence with the pooled data but not with
the panel data. In the regression where FDI interacts with starting income they
do not obtain convergence.
In these studies, FDI is one of many explanatory variables, so its role in
convergence is not clear. By contrast, our study, focusing on contributions to
growth of starting income and FDI in the core empirical growth model, finds
that both FDI and starting income thresholds play crucial roles in convergence.
However, among countries that are converging, the rate of convergence is slow,
at between 0.03 and 0.11 percent for those with FDI exceeding the growth-effect
threshold. This is similar to the convergence rate of 0.07 percent found in the linear
FDI models of Borensztein et al. (1998) and Alfaro et al. (2004). Convergence of
manufacturing sectors only across countries may be faster at 0.24 percent per year,
but that measurement is sensitive to the explanatory variables are included in the
model (Alfaro, 2003).
As already noted, linear growth models with FDI cannot distinguish local
from global convergence, except by imposing sample divisions and checking for
differences in parameter values. Recall that Blömstrom et al. (1992) find in small
samples that FDI has a positive effect on growth in middling countries but not in
poor countries. One might think, then, that middling countries would be converg-
ing among themselves, as they all receive FDI from the rich countries, while poor
countries might not converge among themselves or with middling or rich countries,
since FDI is not effective in them. However, the case is the opposite: Blömstrom
et al. (1992) fail to find convergence among middling countries, but do find it
among poor countries. Poor countries may well share a low level of technology
in the absence of effective FDI and thus grow to a common income level, though
this is not what we found. It is harder to say why middling countries receiving
effective FDI would be diverging, unless the effect of FDI on the macro-economy
is too small.
The findings in Blömstrom et al. (1992) appear to conflict with more re-
cent discoveries in the convergence literature of local convergence among coun-
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tries which start their growth from a sufficiently high income level (Durlauf and
Johnson, 1995; Hansen, 2000; Liu and Stengos, 1999; Quah, 1996a,b, 1997). These
studies, applying various non-linear estimators of the core growth regression model,
allow the data to identify the country groups, by starting income, which are con-
verging. However, their models do not include FDI.
Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Hansen (2000) have non-linear terms in
starting income and initial literacy rate and make similar findings. The former
identifies by regression three per capita income groups in 1960: those of less than
$800, more than $4850, and in between. The poor countries converge to a low-
growth steady-state, while the rich ones diverge. Of the countries in the middle,
there is a further split between those with initial literacy rates above 46 percent,
which are converging, and those with lower rates, which are not converging.
The Hansen (2000) study finds a single significant starting-income threshold
value of $863 in 1960, above which countries converge. It then finds another split
of the non-poor countries at a literacy rate of 45 percent, above which countries
converge while below which they do not. Liu and Stengos (1999) have a more
general threshold regression estimator, similar to the one we use, with non-linear
variables in starting income and education. They find that countries with incomes
in 1960 above $1800 are converging among each other, while the others are not.
They also find that education has a positive, but linear, influence on growth.
Our study finds, in the non-linear model with FDI, that convergence is nearly
global among countries with sufficient FDI. That is, poorer countries with sufficient
FDI do not face an starting income or development threshold before they start
catching up to richer countries. However, countries without sufficient FDI do face
such a threshold. Among them, convergence is limited to those starting out with
incomes above 32 percent of the starting income of the U.S. This is close to the
thresholds found by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Hansen (2000) of 29 and 31
percent of U.S. starting income, respectively.
5 When and how FDI works
By our evidence, a country needs a minimum of FDI, at least 18 times per capita
GDP, before growth responds. This is not a large amount, most of the countries
in our sample having achieved it in at least one ten-year period. Beyond that
minimum, FDI increases the growth rate by between 0.83 and 1.57 percentage
points per year. This is a large impact which justifies the attention and resources
governments devote to attracting FDI.
22
Countries do not need to surpass an income or development threshold before
they can either attract enough or benefit from FDI at the macroeconomic level.
Many initially poor and middling countries receive FDI in amounts exceeding
threshold, while some initially rich countries do not receive enough FDI to affect
growth. Further, the beneficial effect of FDI, when it is sufficient, on growth is
larger as starting income is lower. Poorer countries tend to benefit more, which
is necessary if it is to help them catch up to richer countries. FDI can be an
important instrument for reducing poverty and financing development.
Among countries in which FDI is sufficient to be effective at the macroecon-
omic level, convergence is nearly global. That is, given the other growth factors in
the regression model, nearly all these countries are growing to a common long-term
income level. However, the rate of convergence is very slow, at 0.06 percent per
year at the median starting income. The initially poorest countries are converging
at a slightly faster rate, at 0.11 percent per year, than the initially richer countries,
at 0.03 percent per year.
Among countries in which FDI is not sufficient to be effective at the macro-
economic level, convergence is local, selective. There is an starting-income thresh-
old. Above it, all countries are converging to a common long-term income level.
Below it, countries are not converging. The starting-income threshold occurs at
32 percent of the starting income of the U.S. Two-thirds of countries without suf-
ficient FDI fall below the convergence threshold, and are not catching up to rich
countries.
FDI, therefore, makes an important contribution to both growth and conver-
gence. FDI is even necessary for convergence among the poorest countries which
start out below the starting-income threshold. That FDI facilitates convergence
suggests it quickens growth primarily by introducing new technology. However,
even when FDI is sufficient to substantially enhance growth, the convergence rate
across countries is too slow to matter much.
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A Sample and data
Our sample consists of 128 countries (Table A-1), over the years 1970 to 1999,
divided into three ten-year periods: 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99. We start from
1970, instead of the usual 1960 in the literature, because that is when the FDI data
series begins. Each observation is either a starting value of or an average for the
ten-year period. We experimented with dividing the sample into seven five-year
periods from 1970 to 2004, but the results were too noisy to tell a coherent story,
probably reflecting the influences of business cycles and temporary shocks.
Our early regression model included variables for education and life ex-
pectance, as is usual in the convergence literature, to capture human capital.
However, as reported, the education variable was not statistically significant, and
so we dropped it from the model. Dropping education allowed us to expand the
number of countries in the sample from 88, which is usual in previous studies, to
128. The 40 new countries are mostly poorer countries, and the expanded sample
likely accounts for some of the differences in our results from previous studies.
We removed two outlier observations from the sample: China 1990-99 (for
FDI) and Liberia 1990-99 (for GDP0). The regression on this sample identified
an FDI threshold, above which FDI increases the rate of growth. We confirmed
our results by splitting the sample at the threshold and re-estimating the model on
both sub-samples. From the ‘above-threshold’ sub-sample we removed a further
two outlier observations: Congo DRC 1990-99 and Ethiopia 1990-99, both for
GDP0).
Nearly half the countries in our sample experienced at least one ten-year
period between 1970 and 1999 in which the average amount of FDI fell below
the threshold needed to benefit macroeconomic growth (Table A-2), as identified
by the model estimated on the full sample. About 82 percent of the countries
in the full sample experienced at least one ten-year period in which average FDI
was above the growth threshold (Table A-3).9 FDI falls below the growth-effect
threshold in one-third of our country-period observations. Other than FDI itself,
which identifies the threshold and divides the sample, the data do not differ much
in nature between the full and sub-samples (Table A-4).
We obtained our data from the Barro-Lee database, the Penn World Tables,
UNCTAD’s FDI database, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(Table A-5).
9Countries that appear in both sub-samples had some periods in which FDI was below
the growth threshold and some in which it was above the threshold. Thus, the sum of
countries in the sub-samples exceeds the number in the full sample.
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Table A-1: Countries in the sample (128)
Algeria Dominican Rep. Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Antigua Ecuador Liberia Senegal
Argentina Egypt Macao Sierra Leone
Australia El Salvador Madagascar Singapore
Austria Ethiopia Malawi Solomon Islands
Bahamas Fiji Malaysia Somalia
Bahrain Finland Maldives South Africa
Bangladesh France Mali Spain
Barbados Gabon Malta Sri Lanka
Belgium Gambia Mauritania St Lucia
Belize Germany Mauritius St Vincent
Benin Ghana Mexico Sudan
Bermuda Greece Morocco Suriname
Bolivia Guatemala Mozambique Swaziland
Botswana Guinea Nepal Sweden
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Switzerland
Brunei Haiti New Zealand Syria
Burkina Faso Honduras Nicaragua Thailand
Burundi Hong Kong Niger Togo
Cameroon Iceland Nigeria Tonga
Canada India Norway Trinidad & Tobago
C. African Rep. Indonesia Oman Tunisia
Chad Iran Pakistan Turkey
Chile Ireland Panama Uganda
China Israel Papua New Guinea United Arab Emir.
Colombia Italy Paraguay United Kingdom
Congo DR Jamaica Peru United States
Congo Japan Philippines Uruguay
Costa Rica Jordan Portugal Vanuatu
Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Qatar Venezuela
Cyprus Korea, Rep. Rwanda Zambia
Denmark Kuwait Samoa Zimbabwe
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Table A-2: Countries without enough FDI in some periods (63)
Algeria Denmark Malawi Sri Lanka
Antigua Ethiopia Maldives St Lucia
Bahamas Fiji Mali St Vincent
Bahrain Finland Malta Sudan
Bangladesh Gabon Mauritania Suriname
Barbados Gambia Mauritius Swaziland
Belize Guinea Mozambique Sweden
Benin Guinea-Bissau Nepal Syria
Botswana Haiti Nicaragua Tonga
Brunei Iceland Oman Trinidad & Tobago
Burkina Faso Israel Paraguay Uganda
Burundi Jordan Qatar United Arab Emir.
C. African Rep. Kuwait Rwanda Uruguay
Chile Lesotho Samoa Vanuatu
China Macao Solomon Islands Zimbabwe
Cyprus Madagascar Somalia
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Table A-3: Countries with enough FDI in some periods (105)
Algeria Ecuador Liberia Singapore
Argentina Egypt Madagascar Somalia
Australia El Salvador Malawi South Africa
Austria Finland Malaysia Spain
Bahrain France Mali Sri Lanka
Bangladesh Gabon Mexico St Lucia
Belgium Gambia Morocco Sudan
Benin Germany Mozambique Suriname
Bermuda Ghana Nepal Swaziland
Bolivia Greece Netherlands Sweden
Botswana Guatemala New Zealand Switzerland
Brazil Guinea Nicaragua Syria
Burkina Faso Haiti Niger Thailand
Cameroon Honduras Nigeria Togo
Canada Hong Kong Norway Trinidad & Tobago
C. African Rep. India Oman Tunisia
Chad Indonesia Pakistan Turkey
Chile Iran Panama Uganda
China Ireland Papua New Guinea United Kingdom
Colombia Israel Paraguay United States
Congo DR Italy Peru Vanuatu
Congo Jamaica Philippines Venezuela
Costa Rica Japan Portugal Zambia
Côte d’Ivoire Jordan Rwanda Zimbabwe
Cyprus Kenya Saudi Arabia
Denmark Korea, Rep. Senegal
Dominican Rep. Lesotho Sierra Leone
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Table A-4: Descriptive statistics for the data
Variable Minimum Median Mean Maximum St dev
Full sample (382 obs)
GRO −0.096 0.015 0.015 0.163 0.029
ln(INV ) 0.401 2.560 2.506 4.026 0.624
ln(POP ) −8.043 −3.816 −4.132 −1.830 0.886
ln(LIFE0) 3.456 4.187 4.119 4.376 0.195
ln(OPEN) 1.451 4.107 4.050 5.801 0.706
ln(GDP0) 0.571 2.927 2.923 5.756 1.134
ln(FDI) −3.283 3.648 3.459 8.283 2.102
FDI-below-threshold sub-sample (126 obs)
GRO −0.084 0.011 0.015 0.163 0.035
ln(INV ) 0.401 2.451 2.340 3.504 0.614
ln(POP ) −7.779 −3.746 −4.038 −1.830 0.878
ln(LIFE0) 3.456 4.187 4.098 4.359 0.208
ln(OPEN) 2.394 4.486 4.279 5.563 0.699
ln(GDP0) 0.670 2.811 2.841 5.756 1.217
ln(FDI) −3.283 1.733 1.159 2.851 1.507
FDI-above-threshold sub-sample (254 obs)
GRO −0.073 0.017 0.016 0.081 0.024
ln(INV ) 0.748 2.661 2.595 4.026 0.610
ln(POP ) −8.043 −3.828 −4.184 −2.896 0.889
ln(LIFE0) 3.605 4.189 4.133 4.376 0.186
ln(OPEN) 1.451 3.967 3.946 5.801 0.677
ln(GDP0) 0.933 2.972 2.981 4.785 1.075
ln(FDI) 2.858 4.360 4.587 8.283 1.265
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Table A-5: Data sources
Variable Description Source
GRO Growth rate, computed from PPP-converted PWT
GDP per capita, constant prices, percent (RGDPL)
INV Investment share of PPP-converted PWT (KI)
GDP per capita at constant prices, percent
POP Population growth rate, annual, percent WDI
LIFE0 Initial life expectancy at birth, years WDI
EDUC0 Initial average schooling years of the BL (TYR)
population aged 15 and up
OPEN The sum of exports and imports divided PWT
by PPP-converted GDP per capita, (OPENK)
constant prices
GDP0 Initial PPP-converted GDP per capita, PWT (Y)
current prices, relative to that of the U.S.,
index, U.S. = 100
FDI Net inflows of FDI, current US$, divided WDI (main)
by GDP per capita, current US$, percent and UNCTAD
Note: All variables except GRO are converted to natural logarithms.
Sources
BL Barro-Lee database (Jong-Wha and Barro, 2001): http://www.cid.
harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
PWT Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006): http://www.
pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
UNCTAD UNCTAD, FDI database: http://www.unctad.org
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